The Newer Incoherence: Competition, Social Science, and Balancing in Campaign Finance Law After Randall v. Sorrell by Hasen, Richard L.
The Newer Incoherence: Competition, Social
Science, and Balancing in Campaign Finance Law
After Randall v. Sorrell
RICHARD L. HASEN*
This Article considers the Supreme Court's recent decision in Randall v.
Sorrell striking down Vermont's campaign expenditure and contribution
limits. The Supreme Court's campaign finance jurisprudence before
Randall was marked by swings in doctrine and general incoherence. At first
glance, the plurality opinion in Randall appears to add a level of coherence
to campaign finance law by judging the constitutionality of such laws
through an assessment of the relationship between campaign contribution
limits and political competition. Alas, the appearance of coherence is
illusory, and there is little reason to believe Randall marks a significant
move by the Court to embrace the political markets approach.
As Part III explains, the Court in Randall has not embraced competition as
the organizing principle for analyzing the constitutionality of all campaign
finance laws or election laws. The focus on competition-which garnered
the votes of only three Justices, and one of the three noncommittally-
appears to be the outcome of a compromise between Justice Breyer, who
wanted to preserve as much of existing doctrine as possible against a
deregulationist trend, and the two newest Justices on the Court. Existing
Supreme Court election law doctrine, including its recent partisan
gerrymandering jurisprudence, also rejects the anticompetition principle as
a means of deciding election law cases.
Part IV then turns from external coherence to the internal coherence of the
competition test for low contribution limits, finding the test less predictable
and coherent than its technocratic nature suggests. Following Randall, it
appears that challenges to low contribution limits will turn-or at least
appear to turn-upon fact-intensive political science expert testimony about
the amount of money necessary to run a competitive race in the relevant
jurisdiction. But such testimony often will be speculative when it comes to
whether enough money may be raised to insure a competitive race. Court
decisions could well turn upon a thin credibility determination to be made
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by the court, a determination that may depend upon each judge's
predisposition to favor or oppose the particular campaign finance
regulation.
Part V advocates that courts engage in a careful and honest balancing that
gives considerable deference to the value judgments made by states in
enacting campaign finance laws, but then use close scrutiny to make sure
the measure is carefully drawn to meet those goals. This kind of honest
balancing was impossible in Randall because of the Court's ostensible
rejection of the political equality rationale for campaign finance regulation.
The real question the Randall Court should have asked is whether the
Vermont law was closely drawn to promote political equality and, if so,
whether the costs to individuals and groups who wanted to mobilize for
political action were too great to allow the law to go forward despite its
gains in promoting political equality.
I. INTRODUCTION
Coherence has never been the Supreme Court's long suit in its campaign
finance cases. 1 By the end of 2003, it appeared that things could not get any
worse in this regard. The Court had just decided McConnell v. Federal
Election Commission,2 upholding most of the Bipartisan Campaign Reform
Act of 2002 ("BCRA"), commonly referred to as the "McCain-Feingold
law" for its two Senate sponsors. The Court in McConnell, as part of four
recent Supreme Court cases making up "the New Deference Quartet," 3
1 Cf JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW
121 (1980) (citing "administrability" as the one person, one vote doctrine's "long suit"
and noting that the "more troublesome question is what else it has to recommend it"). In
recent years, even the administrability of the one person, one vote rule has been
undermined, as the Court appeared to allow, and then perhaps backed away from
allowing, the rule to be used to police partisan gerrymandering. See Larios v. Cox, 542
U.S. 947 (2004) (Stevens, J., concurring) (suggesting such a use of the one person, one
vote rule). But see id. at 951 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (rejecting such a suggestion); Samuel
Issacharoff & Pamela S. Karlan, Where to Draw the Line?, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 541
(2004); League of United Latin Am. Citizens v. Perry, 126 S. Ct. 2594, 2612 (2006)
(Kennedy, J., concurring) ("Even in addressing political motivation as a justification for
an equal-population violation, moreover, Larios does not give clear guidance.").
2 540 U.S. 93 (2003).
3 See Richard L. Hasen, Rethinking the Unconstitutionality of Contribution and
Expenditure Limits in Ballot Measure Campaigns, 78 S. CAL. L. REV. 885, 886 (2005).
The other three cases are Nixon v. Shrink Missouri Government PAC, 528 U.S. 377
(2000), Federal Election Commission v. Colorado Republican Federal Campaign
Committee (Colorado 11), 533 U.S. 431 (2001), and Federal Election Commission v.
Beaumont, 539 U.S. 146 (2003).
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seemed poised to embrace a political equality rationale for campaign
financing. In particular, the Court seemed to tacitly endorse the
"participatory self-government" objective for campaign finance reform
proposed by Justice Breyer in a concurring opinion in one of the earlier New
Deference cases. 4 It nonetheless "continued to entertain the fiction that it
[was] adhering to the anticorruption rationale of Buckley v. Valeo, perhaps
because one or two members of the five-Justice majority making the shift in
McConnell may [have been] unwilling ... to expressly embrace" the
participatory self-government rationale.5 The tension between what the
Court was saying and what it was doing strained the credulity of the
enterprise.
Justice O'Connor was one of the five members of the McConnell
majority, a Justice whose position on some fundamental campaign finance
questions shifted at least three times during her tenure on the Court. 6 Her
departure from the Court and replacement with Justice Alito held out the
promise of a more coherent approach to this area of the law. 7 Coherence may
eventually emerge, but it did not do so in the Roberts Court's first major
foray into the area in Randall v. Sorrell.8 In Randall, the Court by a 6-3 vote
struck down Vermont's campaign spending limits and low individual
4 Shrink Missouri, 528 U.S. at 400-04 (Breyer, J., concurring). Justice Breyer
expanded on his ideas in STEPHEN BREYER, ACTIVE LIBERTY: INTERPRETING OUR
DEMOCRATIC CONSTITUTION 39-55 (2005).
5 Richard L. Hasen, Buckley Is Dead: Long Live Buckley: The New Campaign
Finance Incoherence of McConnell v. Federal Election Commission, 153 U. PA. L. REV.
31, 32 (2004).
6 See id. at 32 n.7.
7 Coherence could come in a number of ways, including through either a more
explicit embrace of "participatory self-government" or through a shifting of campaign
finance doctrine toward deregulation through a coalition among the remaining dissenters
in McConnell, Justice Alito, and Chief Justice Roberts, who replaced McConnell
dissenter Chief Justice Rehnquist. The latter course seemed (and still seems) more likely
than the former, at least given the new composition of the Court. See Richard L. Hasen,
No Exit? The Roberts Court and the Future of Election Law, 57 S.C. L. REV. 669, 677
(2006) ("While it is impossible to know how Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Alito will
vote in future campaign finance cases, further expansion of the New Deference seems the
least likely possibility.").
8 126 S. Ct. 2479 (2006). Earlier in the 2005 Term, without the participation of
Justice Alito, the Justices unanimously reversed a three-judge court opinion rejecting an
"as applied" challenge to BCRA. Wis. Right to Life v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 126 S. Ct.
1016 (2006). This ruling was not one on the merits of the "as applied" challenge, and the
case is now back before the Supreme Court. See 127 S. Ct. 1145 (2007); Richard
Briffault, WRTL and Randall: The Roberts Court and the Unsettling of Campaign
Finance Law, 68 OHIO ST. L.J. 807, 817 (2007) (discussing WRTL).
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campaign contribution limits as violations of the First Amendment. The
controlling plurality opinion in the case is that of Justice Breyer, joined by
Chief Justice Roberts and, in part, by Justice Alito. Part II of this Article
places Randall in the context of the Supreme Court's campaign finance
jurisprudence, and details the plurality's new approach to judging the
constitutionality of low contribution limits. It shows that Randall marks a
definite shift away from the New Deference, though it is hard to predict how
far the Court ultimately will move away from that approach.
At first glance, the plurality opinion in Randall appears to add a level of
coherence to campaign finance law by judging the constitutionality of such
laws through an assessment of the relationship between campaign
contribution limits and political competition. That result appears to be good
news both for those who want a more coherent doctrine and for those who
believe that courts should judge election laws primarily through an
assessment of the law's anticompetitive effect. Alas, the appearance of
coherence is illusory, and there is little reason to believe Randall marks a
significant move by the Courts to embrace the "political markets" approach.
As Part III explains, the Court in Randall has not embraced competition
as the organizing principle for analyzing the constitutionality of all campaign
finance laws or election laws. Far from it. The focus on competition-which
garnered the votes of only three Justices, and one of the three
noncommittally-appears to be the outcome of a compromise between
Justice Breyer, who wanted to preserve as much of existing doctrine as
possible against a deregulationist trend, and the two newest Justices on the
Court. Competition arose in Randall to test the constitutionality of low
contribution limits as a rear-guard action by Justice Breyer to cling to the
framework of Buckley v. Valeo,9 and not out of a larger Court commitment
to using courts to promote competition. Indeed, the Court's recent political
gerrymandering cases reject competition as an organizing principle. In any
case, the Court's use of competition in Randall appears evanescent, perhaps
to be replaced in a few years with a more coherent, but considerably less
deferential, deregulationist approach.
Part III shows that the competition test for low contribution limits does
not fit coherently into the Supreme Court's larger campaign finance or
election law jurisprudence. Part IV then turns from external coherence to the
internal coherence of the competition test for low contribution limits,
finding the test less predictable and coherent than its technocratic nature
suggests. The plurality's test appears to rely in large part on social science
evidence about the localized effects of contribution limits on competition: if
contribution limits are so low as to prevent candidates in a particular
9 424 U.S. 1 (1976).
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jurisdiction from raising adequate resources in competitive elections, the
limits must be struck down. But the social science literature regarding the
effects of low contribution limits on political competition is indefinite, with
the most recent studies suggesting that contribution limits promote political
competition. Moreover, the plurality's analysis ignores the adaptation that
occurs among political actors when the rules change. There is good reason to
believe that candidates in competitive races could continue to run
competitive races even with low contribution limits as candidates and parties
adopt strategies to attract enough donors to provide money to run a
competitive race. That is, the very "hydraulic effect" of campaign financing
(money flows in new directions when stopped in one place) suggests that
low contribution limits often will not prevent the amassing of funds for the
running of competitive campaigns. I use the example of post-BCRA
fundraising to illustrate this point.
Following Randall, it appears that challenges to low contribution limits
will turn-or at least appear to turn-upon fact-intensive political science
expert testimony about the amount of money necessary to run a competitive
race in the relevant jurisdiction. But such testimony often will be speculative
when it comes to whether enough money may be raised (by the candidates or
others) to insure a competitive race. Court decisions could well turn upon a
thin credibility determination to be made by the court, a determination that
may depend not so much upon an evaluation of social science but upon each
judge's predisposition to favor or oppose the particular campaign finance
regulation. As we shall see, the Randall plurality itself rejected contrary
evidence from the Burlington mayoral race showing vigorous competition in
the face of low contribution limits on grounds that the facts of that race were
"not described in sufficient detail to offer a convincing refutation"' 10 of the
opponents' expert studies.
Having found the new campaign finance jurisprudence of Randall as
incoherent as its predecessor jurisprudence, I advocate in Part V a more
coherent approach that the Court should use in judging the constitutionality
of low campaign contribution limits and other campaign finance laws.
Courts should engage in a careful and honest balancing that gives
considerable deference to the value judgments made by states in enacting
campaign finance laws, but then use close scrutiny to make sure the measure
is carefully drawn to meet those goals. If the measure is not closely drawn,
the court should strike it down as unconstitutional. If it is closely drawn, the
court must then consider whether the measure is nonetheless
unconstitutional because of the speech and association costs it imposes.
'O Randall, 126 S. Ct. at 2496 (plurality opinion).
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This kind of honest balancing was impossible in Randall because of the
Court's existing campaign finance jurisprudence. Vermont was forced to
defend its law on grounds that it was necessary to prevent corruption or the
appearance of corruption, but it had no real evidence to offer to prove that
such low contribution limits really were necessary to prevent corruption or
its appearance. It seems quite obvious that the real goal of the Vermont
measure, hidden from debate in order to comply with Buckley, was the
promotion of political equality. Thus, the real question the Randall Court
should have asked is whether the Vermont law was closely drawn to promote
political equality and, if so, whether the costs to individuals and groups who
wanted to mobilize for political action was too great to allow the law to go
forward despite its gains in promoting political equality.
One criticism I expect is that my approach is a no more coherent or
predictable means of judging the constitutionality of campaign finance laws
than the current and earlier approaches that I have criticized. But coherence
emerges through transparency. Courts appear to already be engaged in a sub
silentio balancing of rights and interests, in a convoluted and hidden way
because of the legacy of Buckley. By having judges engage in balancing
openly and forthrightly, we will be better able to examine and judge the
value choices made by judges. The giving of real reasons will impose some
rationality on the system. Social science, and what it can tell us about the
effects of campaign finance law on competition, can help in this honest
balancing process, but social science is no substitute for judicial balancing.
II. LET'S Do THE TIME WARP AGAIN: BUCKLEY'S (TEMPORARY?)
RESURRECTION IN RANDALL
A. Before Randall: From Buckley to Skepticism to Deference"
Current campaign finance jurisprudence traces its origins to the Supreme
Court's 1976 per curiam decision in Buckley v. Valeo,12 which (among other
things 13) upheld against a First Amendment challenge an individual $1,000
contribution limit in federal elections and struck down limits on spending by
11 This section offers a thumbnail sketch of the Supreme Court's campaign finance
jurisprudence. For a more detailed discussion, see RICHARD L. HAsEN, THE SUPREME
COURT AND ELECTION LAW: JUDGING EQUALITY FROM BAKER v. CARR TO BUSH V. GoRE
104-20 (2003) and Hasen, supra note 5, at 35-46. This section draws from those earlier
discussions.
12 424 U.S. 1 (1976).
13 The Court also upheld campaign finance disclosure rules and a voluntary public
financing system for presidential campaigns. It struck down the means of choosing
members of the Federal Election Commission. See Hasen, supra note 5, at 37.
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candidates and individuals. Buckley itself was drafted by committee, and
some of its internal inconsistencies may best be explained by tensions in
reasoning among the authors of its various parts. 14
Although recognizing that any law regulating campaign financing was
subject to the "exacting scrutiny required by the First Amendment,"' 15 the
Court mandated divergent treatment of contributions and expenditures for
two reasons. First, the Court held that campaign expenditures were core
political speech, but a limit on the amount of campaign contributions only
marginally restricted a contributor's ability to send a message of support for
a candidate. 16 Thus, expenditures were entitled to greater constitutional
protection than contributions. Second, the Buckley Court recognized only the
interests in prevention of both corruption and the appearance of corruption
as justifying infringement on First Amendment rights.
The Court held that large contributions raise the problem of corruption
"[t]o the extent that large contributions are given to secure a political quid
pro quo from current and potential officeholders."' 17 But truly independent
expenditures do not raise the same danger of corruption because a quidpro
quo is more difficult if politician and spender cannot communicate about the
expenditure. 18
With the corruption interest having failed to justify a limit upon
independent expenditures, the Court considered the alternative argument that
expenditure limits were justified by "the ancillary governmental interest in
equalizing the relative ability of individuals and groups to influence the
outcome of elections."' 19 In one of the most famous (some would say
notorious) sentences in Buckley, the Court rejected this equality rationale for
campaign finance regulation, at least in the context of expenditure limits:
"[T]he concept that government may restrict the speech of some elements of
our society in order to enhance the relative voice of others is wholly foreign
to the First Amendment .... -20
14 See Richard L. Hasen, The Untold Drafting History of Buckley v. Valeo, 2
ELECTION L.J. 241 (2003). The muddled reasoning of Austin v. Michigan Chamber of
Commerce, 494 U.S. 652 (1990), may also be explained as the result of political
compromise. See HASEN, supra note 11, at 113-14.
15 Buckley, 424 U.S. at 16.
'
6 1d. at 21.
17 Id. at 26-27.
18 Id. at 46-47.
'
9 1d. at 48.
2 0 Id. at 48-49. Seven of the eight Justices deciding the case concurred in this
statement (Justice Stevens, new to the Court, did not participate) though the drafting
history reveals that at least two more of the Justices were ambivalent about the equality
rationale. See HASEN, supra note 11, at 108.
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Specifically on the question of the amount of the contribution limits, the
Buckley Court showed great deference to legislative judgments. For
example, the Court refused to find the amount of the individual contribution
limits set by the Federal Election Campaign Act (FECA) 1974 amendments
at $1,000 (around $3,600 in 2006 dollars21) was too low. 22 The amount of
contribution limitations would raise constitutional problems only when they
prevented candidates and committees from "amassing the resources
necessary for effective advocacy." 23 But the court saw no danger in the
FECA limits. In a footnote, the Court noted that "[i]n 1974, two major-party
senatorial candidates, Ramsey Clark and Senator Charles Mathias, Jr.,
operated large-scale campaigns on contributions raised under a voluntarily
imposed $100 contribution limitation."24 The Court was much less
deferential to Congress in other portions of the Buckley opinion, however,
especially when it came to striking down spending limits.
Thus, the seeds of the Supreme Court's later incoherence in the
campaign finance area were sown in Buckley, with parts of the opinion
expressing deference to legislative judgments and other parts showing much
less deference. The Supreme Court's campaign finance cases from Buckley
until Randall divide into two periods, a period of skepticism followed by a
period of deference, though in both periods the Court has always proclaimed
it has followed the Buckley mandate. 25 Because of Buckley's internal
schizophrenia, these proclamations have always passed the laugh test.
In the period of skepticism immediately following Buckley, the Court
rejected limits on contributions and on corporate expenditures in ballot
measure campaigns,26 using language in those cases that elevated the First
Amendment over other plausible state interests in limiting campaign
financing such as preserving voter confidence in the integrity of the electoral
process. 27 In another case from the period of skepticism, the Court rejected a
21 Calculated using the "inflation calculator" at the Bureau of Labor Statistics
website, http://www.bls.gov.
22 Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 30 (1976).
23 1d. at21.
24 Id. at 21 n.23.
25 See Allison Hayward, The Per Curiam Opinion of Steel: Buckley v. Valeo as
Superprecedent? Clues from Wisconsin and Vermont, 2006 CATO SUP. CT. REv. 195,205
n.58 ("Whatever their differences [between the periods of skepticism and deference],
both sets of decisions claim faithfulness to Buckley v. Valeo.").
26 First Nat'l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 767 (1978); Citizens Against
Rent Control v. City of Berkeley, 454 U.S. 290, 299-300 (1981).
27 See Hasen, supra note 3, at 885-86 ("These precedents emerged from the
Supreme Court at the time of its greatest hostility to campaign finance regulation, when it
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provision of federal law limiting independent spending in presidential
campaigns when the candidates had agreed to accept voluntary public
financing.28 This latter case is most notable for its narrow definition of
"corruption" 29 and for its deference to the lower court's finding (and
concomitant lack of deference to Congress, which passed the law) that the
evidence of corruption or its appearance supporting the challenged law was
"evanescent." 30
Following an important case in the 1990s upholding limits on corporate
expenditures in candidate elections (under what looked very much like an
equality rationale), 31 the Supreme Court in the 2000s shifted into a period of
unprecedented deference to legislative decisions to enact campaign finance
laws. The most important of these cases for our purposes was the Court's
2000 opinion in Nixon v. Shrink Missouri Government PAC, 32 followed by
Federal Election Commission v. Colorado Republican Federal Campaign
Committee (Colorado //),33 Federal Election Commission v. Beaumont,34
and the McConnell case 35 noted in the Introduction.
The Court majority in Shrink Missouri upheld the constitutionality of
Missouri's low campaign contribution limits for state office against a First
Amendment challenge and did so in four ways of jurisprudential
significance. 36 First, the Court ratcheted down the level of scrutiny from
Buckley's "exacting" level of scrutiny to one in which interests need only be
"sufficiently important"37 and not narrowly tailored to the government's
viewed such laws as impermissibly impinging on the rights of free speech and
association guaranteed by the First Amendment.").
28 Fed. Election Comm'n v. Nat'l Conservative Political Action Comm. (NCPAC),
470 U.S. 480, 497-98 (1985).
29 "Corruption is a subversion of the political process. Elected officials are
influenced to act contrary to their obligations of office by the prospect of financial gain to
themselves or infusions of money into their campaigns. The hallmark of corruption is the
financial quidpro quo: dollars for political favors." Id. at 497.
30 Id. at 499.
31 Austin v. Mich. Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 660 (1990). On why the
Austin rationale was a disguised equality rationale, see HASEN, supra note 11, at 111-14.
32 528 U.S. 377, 399 (2000).
33 533 U.S. 431 (2001).
34 539 U.S. 146 (2003).
35 McConnell v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 540 U.S. 93 (2003).
36 1 provide greater details on these claims in Richard L. Hasen, Shrink Missouri,
Campaign Finance, and "The Thing that Wouldn't Leave," 17 CONST. COMMENT. 483,
490-97 (2000).
37 Shrink Missouri, 528 U.S. at 388.
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interest. 38 Second, the Court expanded the definition of corruption and the
appearance of corruption sufficient to justify campaign finance regulation.
The Court explained that corruption extended beyond quid pro quo
arrangements to embrace "the broader threat from politicians too compliant
with the wishes of large contributors."39 As for the appearance of corruption,
the Court remarked: "Leave the perception of impropriety unanswered, and
the cynical assumption that large donors call the tune could jeopardize the
willingness of voters to take part in democratic governance." 40
Third, the Court lowered the evidentiary burden for proving corruption
or its appearance. The Court began by noting that "[t]he quantum of
empirical evidence needed to satisfy heightened judicial scrutiny of
legislative judgments will vary up or down with the novelty and plausibility
of the justification raised."'41 Although the Court insisted that "mere
conjecture" 42 was not enough to support a campaign limit, it held that
Missouri could justify the need for its contribution limits to fight corruption
or the appearance of corruption by some pretty flimsy evidence: the affidavit
from a Missouri legislator who had supported the legislation stating that
"large contributions have 'the real potential to buy votes;' ' 43 newspaper
accounts suggesting possible corruption in Missouri politics; and the passage
of an earlier Missouri voter initiative establishing campaign contribution
limits.
Fourth, the Court created a difficult test for challenging the
constitutionality of a contribution limit as too low to prevent effective
advocacy. Refining (or changing) the effective advocacy test from Buckley,
the Court stated: "We asked, in other words, whether the contribution
limitation was so radical in effect as to render political association
ineffective, drive the sound of a candidate's voice below the level of notice,
and render contributions pointless." 44 In an era of faxes, web pages, and e-
mails, it is hard to imagine any contribution limit that would fail the Shrink
Missouri test of constitutionality.
Shrink Missouri was also the case where Justice Breyer, in a concurring
opinion, first set forth application of his participatory self-government
rationale to campaign finance questions. Remarking that Buckley's statement
rejecting the equality rationale being wholly foreign to the First Amendment
38 Id. (noting "the dollar amount of the limit need not be 'fine tun[ed]').
3 9 Id. at 389.
4 0 Id. at 390.
41 Id. at 391.
4 2 Id. at 392.
43 Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov't PAC, 528 U.S. 377, 393 (2000).
4 4 Id. at 397.
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"cannot be taken literally," 45 Justice Breyer posited that "constitutionally
protected interests lie on both sides of the legal equation." 46 He explained:
On the one hand, a decision to contribute money to a campaign is a
matter of First Amendment concern-not because money is speech (it is
not); but because it enables speech .... On the other hand, restrictions upon
the amount any one individual can contribute to a particular candidate seek
to protect the integrity of the electoral process-the means through which a
free society democratically translates political speech into concrete
governmental action. Moreover, by limiting the size of the largest
contributions, such restrictions aim to democratize the influence that money
itself may bring to bear on the electoral process. In doing so, they seek to
build public confidence in that process and broaden the base of a candidate's
meaningful financial support, encouraging the public participation and open
discussion that the First Amendment itself presupposes. 47
Justice Breyer then called for deference to the legislature's
understanding of "the threat to electoral integrity [and] the need for
democratization," 48 though not for deference with respect to whether a
contribution limit "significantly increases the reputation-related or media-
related advantages of incumbency." 49
The other three cases making up the "New Deference Quartet" continued
this trend toward relaxing Buckley's rules, though the details are not
important for purposes of this Article.50 Throughout this transition to the
New Deference, the Court continued to give lip service to fidelity to
Buckley, all the while moving toward a level of deference consistent with
Justice Breyer's participatory self-government rationale. By the time the
Court decided the McConnell case, upholding almost all of the challenged
provisions of McCain-Feingold, Buckley appeared dead in all but name. 51
45 Id. at 402 (Breyer, J., concurring).
46 Id. at 400 (Breyer, J., concurring).
47 Id. at 400-01 (Breyer, J. concurring) (citation omitted).
4 8 Id. at 403 (Breyer, J., concurring).
49 Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov't PAC, 528 U.S. 377, 404 (2000) (Breyer, J.,
concurring). On this point, Justice Breyer wrote that the statutory limit was "low enough
to raise such a question. But given the empirical information presented... I agree with
the Court that the statute does not work disproportionate harm." Id.
50 For details, see Hasen, supra note 5, at 44-57.
51 See id. for a sustained argument on this point. But see Daniel H. Lowenstein,
BCRA and McConnell in Perspective, 3 ELECTION L.J. 277, 282 (2004) (writing soon
after the McConnell case: "Buckley is not only not dead, it may not be dying at all.").
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B. Randall Resurrects Buckley, Perhaps Killing Shrink Missouri
In Randall v. Sorell,52  the Supreme Court considered the
constitutionality of contribution and expenditure limits imposed in 1997 by
the Vermont Legislature through Vermont's "Act 64." 53 The case marked
the first campaign finance case heard by both of the two new Justices on the
Supreme Court, Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Alito.54 Justice Alito's
presence was particularly important, because the most recent New Deference
case, McConnell, was decided on a 5-4 vote, and Justice Alito replaced a
member of the McConnell 5-Justice majority, Justice O'Connor. Before the
case was decided there was much speculation as to how Justice O'Connor's
replacement could change campaign finance law.55
Act 64 imposed both candidate spending limits and contribution limits:
Act 64 imposes mandatory expenditure limits on the total amount a
candidate for state office can spend during a "two-year general election
cycle," i.e., the primary plus general election, in approximately the
following amounts: governor, $300,000; lieutenant governor, $100,000;
other statewide offices $45,000; state senator, $4,000 (plus an additional
$2,500 for each additional seat in the district); state representative (two-
member district), $3,000; and state representative (single member district),
$2,000. These limits are adjusted for inflation in odd-numbered years based
on the Consumer Price Index. 56
The Act also imposed additional limits on incumbents seeking election,
and defined "expenditure[s]" broadly. 57 Moreover, Act 64 treated certain
expenditures made by others against a candidate's limit. "These provisions
apply so as to count against a campaign's expenditure limit any spending by
52 126 S. Ct. 2479 (2006).
53 VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 17, § 2801 (2002).
54 Chief Justice Roberts, but not Justice Alito, heard the Wisconsin Right to Life
case, but that case resulted in a remand rather than an opinion of any broad significance.
See supra note 8.
55 Writing before Justice Alito's appointment to the Supreme Court, Richard
Briffault observed: "If Chief Justice Roberts and Justice O'Connor's successor join
[Justices Scalia, Thomas, and Kennedy], then Buckley could fall-but in the opposite
direction sought by reform advocates." Richard Briffault, US. Supreme Court Case
Preview, A Changing Supreme Court Considers Major Campaign Finance Questions:
Randall v. Sorell, and Wisconsin Right to Life v. FEC, 5 ELECTION L.J. 74, 83 (2006).




political parties or committees that is coordinated with the campaign and
benefits the candidate." 58
As for the contribution limits, Act 64 also imposed strict contribution
limits:
The amount any single individual can contribute to the campaign for a
candidate for state office during a "two-year general election cycle" is
limited as follows: governor, lieutenant governor, and other statewide
offices, $400; state senator, $300; and state representative, $200. Unlike its
expenditure limits, Act 64's contribution limits are not indexed for inflation.
A political committee is subject to these same limits. So is a political
party, defined broadly to include "any subsidiary, branch or local unit" of a
party, as well as any "national or regional affiliates" of a party (taken
separately or together). Thus, for example, the statute treats the local, state,
and national affiliates of the Democratic Party as if they were a single entity
and limits their total contribution to a single candidate's campaign for
governor (during the primary and general election together) to $400. 59
In considering the constitutionality of both the expenditure and
contribution limits, the nine Justices issued six opinions.60 Unsurprisingly, a
majority of the Court held that the candidate spending limits were
58 Id. Moreover, "any party expenditure that 'primarily benefits six or fewer
candidates who are associated with the political party' is 'presumed' to be coordinated
with the campaign and therefore to count against the campaign's expenditure limit." Id.
59 Id. (citations omitted).
60 Just a few days later, in deciding the Texas redistricting case, the Justices again
issued six opinions, LULAC v. Perry, 126 S. Ct. 2594 (2006), showing just how
fractured the new Roberts Court is on some election law questions. See generally Richard
L. Hasen, Political Portents: Latest Supreme Court Rulings on Election Law May
Foreshadow a Far More Conservative Approach, LEGAL TIMES, July 10, 2006, at 52
("The nine justices issued a staggering 12 opinions in the two cases, leaving even
seasoned election-law scholars scratching their heads over the intricacies of the
opinions.").
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unconstitutional under Buckley. 61 For the foreseeable future, constitutional
challenges to the spending limit holding of Buckley now appear foreclosed. 62
The Court's treatment of the contribution limits question, however, is far
more interesting in revealing the possible future direction of its campaign
finance jurisprudence, especially because the Court had to somehow deal
with the recent Shrink Missouri precedent setting forth a very deferential test
for judging the constitutionality of campaign contribution limits alleged to
be too low. Would Shrink Missouri, the band leader of the New Deference
Quartet, cause the Court to continue to play the notes of judicial deference?
Randall answered that question in the negative. On the constitutionality
of Vermont's contribution limits, the Court broke into essentially three
camps:
Group 1: The Deference Justices. Three Justices (Ginsburg, Souter, and
Stevens) would have upheld the Vermont contribution limits under Shrink
Missouri, holding that campaign contribution limits should be struck down
only when they are "laughabl[y]" 63 low and when they would depress
candidates' voices "to the level of political inaudibility."' 64 For these
Justices, the New Deference remains the appropriate legal standard.
Group 2: The Deregulationists. Two Justices (Scalia and Thomas)
would have struck down the Vermont contribution limits not because they
were unconstitutionally low, but out of a belief that all contribution limits
61 Randall, 126 S. Ct. at 2491 (plurality opinion); id. at 2501-02 (Kennedy, J.,
concurring in the judgment) (agreeing that the expenditure limits violate the First
Amendment); id. at 2501 (Thomas, J., joined by Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment)
(agreeing that Act 64 is unconstitutional). Only Justice Stevens voted to uphold the
expenditure limits. Id. at 2506 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justices Souter and Ginsburg
would not have reached the issue, preferring to "adhere to the Court of Appeals' decision
to remand for further enquiry bearing on the limitations on candidates' expenditures." Id.
at 2511 (Souter, J., joined by Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
62 Before the composition of the Court changed, I suggested that the Court might be
poised to accept the constitutionality of spending limits in certain circumstances. See
Hasen, supra note 5, at 67-70. But once the Second Circuit had ordered a remand on the
expenditure limits question, I believe it was a mistake for the supporters of the law to
support, rather than oppose, the petition for a writ of certiorari filed by Act 64's
opponents-particularly given the strictness of Vermont's spending limits. See Posting of
Rick Hasen, "How Smart Was It For Plaintiffs To Support Cert in the Vermont Spending
Limits Case?," to Election Law Blog, http://electionlawblog.org/archives/003606.html
(June 16, 2005, 18:06 EST). And I expressed even greater reservations on going forward
once Justice O'Connor announced her retirement. Posting of Rick Hasen, "Responding to
Brad Smith on Spending Limits Question," to Election Law Blog,
http://electionlawblog.org/archives/004181.html (Sept. 30, 2005, 11:54 EST).
63 Randall, 126 S. Ct. at 2514 (Souter, J., dissenting).
64 Id. at 2516 (Souter, J., dissenting).
[Vol. 68:849
NEWER INCOHERENCE
should be subject to strict scrutiny and struck down as a violation of the First
Amendment. 65 Justice Kennedy was a bit less categorical than Justices
Scalia and Thomas, but he agreed that the Vermont contribution limits were
unconstitutional, being "even more stifling than the ones that survived
Shrink's unduly lenient review." 66
Group 3: The Plurality. Three Justices (Alito, Breyer, and Chief Justice
Roberts) form the new center of the Court on campaign finance issues. I
cannot give Group 3 a descriptive name beyond "The Plurality," because, as
we shall see, it is unclear whether this group will stick together beyond this
one case, and, if so, what the group's position will be on other campaign
finance issues.67 Indeed, Justice Alito added a separate short concurrence in
Randall in which he noted that he decided this case in line with his
understanding of Buckley, and that he was not committing himself one way
or another to the question whether Buckley's campaign finance jurisprudence
was worth "reexamining" in a case squarely presenting the question. 68 This
leaves open the possibility that he (and perhaps Chief Justice Roberts) will
join The Deregulationists when a case squarely presents the question of
Buckley's continued vitality.
The plurality purported to apply existing precedent, including Buckley
and Shrink Missouri, to reach the conclusion that the Vermont contribution
limits, unlike the limits upheld in other cases including Shrink Missouri,
were too low. 69 Because this plurality forms the controlling block of votes
65 Id. at 2502 (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment) ("I would overrule Buckley
and subject both the contribution and expenditure restrictions of Act 64 to strict scrutiny,
which they would fail.").
66 Id. at 2501 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment).
67 In this way, the opinion reads much like the Court's 1996 campaign finance
decision in Colorado Republican Federal Campaign Committee v. FEC, 518 U.S. 604
(1996) (Colorado 1), a decision featuring a three-Justice plurality of Justices Breyer,
O'Connor, and Souter. Ned Foley first noted the parallels between the two cases in an
untaped conference call among election law specialists organized by Professor Nate
Persily of University of Pennsylvania Law School on June 26, 2006, a few hours after the
decision in Randall. Colorado I ducked major constitutional issues before Justices Breyer
and Souter got their "sea legs" on the campaign finance issue. See Hasen, supra note 5, at
42. It would have been difficult to predict from Colorado I how these Justices would
ultimately vote in the campaign finance cases that came just a few years later.
68 Randall, 126 S. Ct. at 2501 (Alito, J., concurring in part and concurring in the
judgment).
69 Id. at 2500 (plurality opinion). Both Justice Thomas and Justice Souter
convincingly argued that the plurality opinion was inconsistent with Shrink Missouri. See
id at 2504 (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment) ("The plurality's current treatment
of the limits in Shrink as a constitutional minimum, or at least as limits below which
'danger signs' are present, thus cannot be reconciled with Shrink itself."); id. at 2513
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on the Court on the question of low contribution limits, it is worth examining
its analysis in some detail.
The plurality draws its constitutional test from the concern noted in
Buckley over contribution limits being so low as to prevent candidates from
amassing resources necessary to engage in effective advocacy. 70 The
plurality opinion notes: "At some point the constitutional risks ... [from low
contribution limits] become too great .... [C]ontribution limits that are too
low can also harm the electoral process by preventing challengers from
mounting effective campaigns against incumbent officeholders, thereby
reducing democratic accountability." '7 1 Citing his own concurring opinion in
Shrink Missouri setting forth the participatory self-government rationale,
Justice Breyer for the plurality added: "[I]ndividual members of the Court
have expressed concern lest too low a limit magnify the 'reputation-related
or media-related advantages of incumbency and thereby insulat[e] legislators
from effective electoral challenge.' 72
The plurality sets forth a two-part test for judging the constitutionality of
the amount of a campaign contribution limit in the "exercise of independent
judicial judgment." 73
(1) Are there "danger signs" that the risks to the political process in
terms of decreased political competition are too high? 74
(2) If so, based on a review of the record, is the measure "closely
drawn," or is it too restrictive given the anticorruption goals it is trying to
accomplish? 75
Applying this two-part test, the plurality held that Vermont's $200-$400
contribution limits per election cycle were unconstitutional. 76 Under the first
part of the test, the plurality concluded: "As compared with the contribution
limits upheld by the Court in the past, and with those in force in other States,
Act 64's limits are sufficiently low as to generate suspicion that they are not
closely drawn."' 77 The plurality pointed to these factors:
(Souter, J., dissenting) ("To place Vermont's contribution limits beyond the
constitutional pale, therefore, is to forget not only the facts of Shrink, but also our self-
admonition against second-guessing legislative judgments about the risk of corruption to
which contribution limits have to be fitted.").
70 See supra text accompanying note 23.




75 Id. at 2491 (plurality opinion); see also id. at 2494 (plurality opinion).
76 Id. at 2500 (plurality opinion).
77 Randall v. Sorrell, 126 S. Ct. 2479, 2492-93 (2006) (plurality opinion).
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* Vermont's limits apply per election cycle (that is, a single limit
applied to contributions made during both the primary and general election),
not per election-so they are essentially half the size they appear to be. 78
* The limits are very low, especially compared to amounts the Court
has upheld in the past, as adjusted for inflation. 79
* The amounts are very low when compared to other state limits
(seven states have contribution limits at or below $500 per election, twice
the Act 64 limits). 80
* No state has a limit lower than $200 on contributions from political
parties to candidates. 8'
* The amount is well below any limit previously upheld. In making
this comparison, the Court looked at the amount of contributions per citizen
("As of 2006, the ratio of the contribution limit to the size of the
constituency in Vermont is .00064, while Missouri's ratio is .00044, 31%
lower."), as well as the type of race involved ("A campaign for state auditor
is likely to be less costly than a campaign for governor; campaign costs do
not automatically increase or decrease in precise proportion to the size of an
electoral district."). 82
Once the plurality determined that there were "danger signs," 83 it moved
to the second part of the test. Under this part, the court must "independently
and carefully ... determine whether [the measure's] contribution limits are
'closely drawn' to match the State's interests. '84 For five reasons, the
plurality held that the Vermont limit was not closely drawn and was
therefore unconstitutional:
0 "First, the record suggests, though it does not conclusively prove,
that Act 64's contribution limits ... [are too] ... restrict[ive]." 85 Much of
this analysis depended upon the testimony of expert witnesses. 86
* "Second, Act 64's insistence that political parties abide by exactly
the same low contribution limits that apply to other contributors threatens
harm to a particularly important political right, the right to associate in a
78 Id. at 2493 (plurality opinion).
79 Id.
80 Id.
81 Id. at 2494 (plurality opinion).
82 Id.
83 Randall v. Sorrell, 126 S. Ct. 2479, 2494 (2006) (plurality opinion).
84 Id.
85 Id. at 2495 (plurality opinion).
86 Id. at 2495-96 (plurality opinion).
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political party."' 87 The plurality also detailed other ways in which the law
hampers political parties. 88
0 "Third, the Act's treatment of volunteer services aggravates the
problem .... [T]he Act does not exclude the expenses those volunteers
incur, such as travel expenses, in the course of campaign activities."8 9 "That
combination, low limits and no exceptions, means" volunteers could easily
exceed the contribution limit through minimal activity such as travel or
giving doughnuts to neighbors. 90
& "Fourth, unlike the contribution limits we upheld in Shrink, . . . Act
64's contribution limits are not adjusted for inflation." 91
* "Fifth, we have found nowhere in the record any special justification
that might warrant a contribution limit so low or so restrictive as to bring
about the serious associational and expressive problems that we have
described." 92
The Court concluded that the limits "violate the First Amendment, for
they burden First Amendment interests in a manner that is disproportionate
to the public purposes they were enacted to advance." 93
Whatever else one may say about the plurality opinion, it certainly marks
a pause, and perhaps the end, of the New Deference approach in the
campaign finance cases. 94 Rather than ask the deferential question, as Justice
Souter did in his dissent, whether Vermont's contribution limits would drive
a candidate's voice to the "level of political inaudibility," 95 the Randall
plurality commanded the use of "independent judicial judgment" 96 to
determine if the Vermont contribution limits were unconstitutionally low. In
exchange for Justice Breyer's language in Shrink Missouri urging legislative
87 Id. at 2496 (plurality opinion).
88 For example, the plurality noted that "the Act would severely inhibit collective
political activity by preventing a political party from using contributions by small donors
to provide meaningful assistance to any individual candidate." Id. at 2497 (plurality
opinion).
89 Randall v. Sorrell, 126 S. Ct. 2479, 2498 (2006) (plurality opinion).
90 Id.
91 Id. at 2499 (plurality opinion).
92 Id.
93 Id. at 2500 (plurality opinion).
94 See Edward B. Foley, The Importance of Randall's Indecisiveness, ELECTION
LAW@MORITZ WEEKLY COMMENT, June 27, 2006,
http://moritzlaw.osu.edu/electionlaw/comments/2006/060627.php (noting the importance
of the Randall plurality's non-reliance on Shrink Missouri).
95 Randall v. Sorrell, 126 S. Ct. 2479, 2516 (2006) (Souter, J., dissenting).
9 6 Id. at 2492 (plurality opinion).
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deference on grounds that the legislature understands the problems of
campaigns better than the Court, 97 the Randall plurality expressed
skepticism of legislative judgments and legislative solutions. Rather than
declaring, as the Court did in Shrink Missouri, that "the dictates of the First
Amendment are not mere functions of the Consumer Price Index, 98 the
Randall plurality found the failure of Vermont to index its limits for
inflation a reason to strike down its contribution limits. 99 Rather than note,
as Justice Breyer did in his Shrink Missouri concurrence, that Buckley's
rejection of the equality rationale for campaign finance reform "cannot be
taken literally,"'100 the Randall plurality chose not to even mention the
97 Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov't PAC, 528 U.S. 377, 403 (2000) (Breyer, J.,
concurring). Indeed, in his book Active Liberty, Justice Breyer writes:
Courts can defer to the legislature's own judgment insofar as that judgment concerns
matters (particularly empirical matters) about which the legislature is comparatively
expert, such as the extent of the campaign finance problem, a matter that directly
concerns the realities of political life. But courts should not defer when they
evaluate the risk that reform legislation will defeat the participatory self-government
objective itself. That risk is present, for example, when laws set contribution limits
so low that they elevate the reputation-related or media-related advantages of
incumbency to the point of insulating incumbent officeholders from effective
challenge.
BREYER, supra note 4, at 49. In support of this statement, Justice Breyer cites to this
passage from the McConnell case extolling the virtues of deference to legislators:
Because the electoral process is the very "means through which a free society
democratically translates political speech into concrete governmental action," Shrink
Missouri, 528 U.S. at 401 (BREYER, J., concurring), contribution limits, like other
measures aimed at protecting the integrity of the process, tangibly benefit public
participation in political debate. For that reason, when reviewing Congress' decision
to enact contribution limits, "there is no place for a strong presumption against
constitutionality, of the sort often thought to accompany the words 'strict scrutiny."'
Id. at 400 (BREYER, J., concurring). The less rigorous standard of review we have
applied to contribution limits (Buckley's "closely drawn" scrutiny) shows proper
deference to Congress' ability to weigh competing constitutional interests in an area
in which it enjoys particular expertise. It also provides Congress with sufficient
room to anticipate and respond to concerns about circumvention of regulations
designed to protect the integrity of the political process.
McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 137 (2003).
98 Shrink, 528 U.S. at 397.
99 Randall, 126 S. Ct. at 2499 (plurality opinion).
100 Shrink, 528 U.S. at 402 (Breyer, J., concurring).
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equality rationale rejected in Buckley, referring to it simply as one of the
"other" interests rejected by the Buckley Court.10'
In the end, those who thought Buckley was dead- have had to witness its
Second Coming. Shrink Missouri has been dealt a perhaps-fatal blow, and
the future of the Court's campaign finance jurisprudence--especially given
Justice Alito's tantalizing invitation for plaintiffs to argue that Buckley's
contribution limit holding should be overruled 2-has become subject to
considerable uncertainty.
The shelf life of Randall may be short. If and when Chief Justice
Roberts and Justice Alito become ready to move into the deregulationist
camp, Justice Kennedy would hold the controlling vote on campaign finance
questions, and it is unclear whether he would vote to overrule Buckley on
contribution limits so as to disallow all contribution limits or simply
continue to apply Buckley in the stringent way he interprets it. 10 3 But
101 Randall, 126 S. Ct. at 2488 (plurality opinion) ("The Court [in Buckley] also
considered other governmental interests advanced in support of expenditure limitations.
It rejected each.").
102 Id. at 2500-01 (Alito, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
103 On this point, it is worth recalling that Justice Kennedy has never gone so far as
Justice Thomas's calls to overrule Buckley and subject all contribution limits to strict
scrutiny, which they would fail. Compare Shrink Missouri, 528 U.S. at 409-10
(Kennedy, J., dissenting) (stating a desire to overrule Buckley, but leaving "open the
possibility that Congress, or a state legislature, might devise a system in which there are
some limits on both expenditures and contributions, thus permitting officeholders to
concentrate their time and efforts on official duties rather than on fundraising"), with id.
at 412 (Thomas, J., joined by Scalia, J., dissenting) ("[C]ontributions to political
campaigns generate essential political speech. And contribution caps, which place a
direct and substantial limit on core speech, should be met with the utmost skepticism and
should receive the strictest scrutiny."). Indeed, after Shrink Missouri, Justice Kennedy
applied Buckley to uphold one portion of BCRA's soft money rules against constitutional
challenge, McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 308 (2003) (Kennedy, J., concurring in the
judgment in part and dissenting in part with respect to BCRA Titles I and H1), a vote that
put him at odds with Justices Scalia and Thomas. See id. at 248 (Scalia, J., concurring
with respect to BCRA Titles III and IV, dissenting with respect to BCRA Titles I and V,
and concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part with respect to BCRA Title
H) ("I join the opinion of JUSTICE KENNEDY, except to the extent it upholds new § 323(e)
of the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971 (FECA) and § 202 of the Bipartisan
Campaign Reform Act of 2002 (BCRA) in part."); id. at 254 (Thomas, J., concurring
with respect to BCRA Titles III and IV, except for BCRA §§ 311 and 318, concurring in
the result with respect to BCRA § 318, concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting




Randall today is the law, 104 and it is worth examining whether the case
creates more coherence in the campaign finance area than existed before it.
As the next two sections show, Randall creates neither external coherence
with respect to the Supreme Court's other campaign finance or election law
cases nor internal coherence with respect to how lower courts will
administer a test for judging the constitutionality of low contribution limits.
III. RANDALL'S EXTERNAL INCOHERENCE AND THE SELECTIVE USE OF
THE ANTI-COMPETITION PARADIGM
At first glance, the plurality opinion in Randall appears to add a level of
coherence to campaign finance law by judging the constitutionality of such
laws through an assessment of the relationship between campaign
contribution limits and political competition. That result appears to be good
news both for those who want a more coherent doctrine and for those who
believe that courts should judge election laws primarily through an
assessment of a law's anticompetitive effect or intent.
As Professor Pildes, one of the leading scholars advocating that the
Supreme Court decide election law cases to promote political competition
(which I'll refer to as the "structural" or political markets approach), 10 5 put it
soon after the Court issued its decision in Randall:
Here is the key point: the Court in this decision makes as clear as it has
in any constitutional decision involving democratic institutions that the
Court views itself as having an essential role to play in preserving the
structural integrity of the democratic process .... [T]he decision rests on
the principle that there is a risk that those who currently hold office-
current legislators-can regulate elections in a way that insulates themselves
improperly [from] competition and that undermines the integrity and
accountability that should be central to democracy and democratic elections.
Most importantly, constitutional law and the Supreme Court must play a role
in responding to that risk, according to the principles of the Vermont
decision.
104 Cf. Daniel H. Lowenstein, Vieth's Gap: Has the Supreme Court Gone from Bad
to Worse on Partisan Gerrymandering?, 14 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 367, 391 (2005)
("I am proceeding on the premise that the law is not a prediction of what the nine Justices
will say in a future case nor a psychological inquiry into what they want, but what can
fairly be gleaned from the decisions they have already issued.").
105 The leading article embracing this approach is Samuel Issacharoff & Richard H.
Pildes, Politics as Markets: Partisan Lockups of the Democratic Process, 50 STAN. L.
REv. 643, 681 (1998). For my critique, see HASEN, supra note 11, ch. 5.
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Justice Breyer has long been drawn to exactly such a view, as I have
noted in earlier articles. The principles on which this decision rests could
have implications for many other issues concerning the Court's oversight,
through constitutional law, of democratic politics. Consider gerrymandering,
most obviously: gerrymandering can be viewed as creating many of the
same kinds of harms-involving incumbent protection, threats to democratic
accountability and to the integrity of elections-and might similarly not be
thought to involve harms to conventional individual rights. The principles of
today's Vermont case might well imply that courts have an essential role,
nonetheless, in protecting the democratic system against various structural
harms insiders are capable of causing to it. For that reason, the Vermont
case is an intriguing and surprisingly important decision, with potentially
broad implications throughout the law of democracy. 106
Professor Pildes wrote these remarks in the hours after the Court issued
its decision in Randall (and two days before the Court issued its opinion in
LULAC). It may be that he no longer believes that Randall is a harbinger of
the Court's embrace of the anti-competition principle in election law cases.
But anyone who sees Randall in this light is likely to be mistaken. The anti-
competition principle appears cabined to campaign finance cases, and likely
applicable only to cases raising the question whether particular campaign
contribution limits are too low.
The most important piece of evidence that the Court has not embraced
(and is not likely to embrace any time soon), the anti-competition principle
in its election law cases, is found in the Court's recent consideration of
partisan gerrymandering claims. As Professor Pildes put it in his post-
Randall remarks, gerrymandering is the "most obvious[]" place for the
courts to rein in excessive anti-competitive actions by state legislatures,
many of whom draw district lines for their own reelection (as well as to
insure the election of their party allies in Congress). 107
Two years before the Court decided Randall, it decided Vieth v.
Jubelirer,10 8 in which the Court split 4-1-4 over whether courts should
impose limits on line-drawing done to achieve partisan gains. In Vieth, four
Justices voted to hold partisan gerrymandering claims completely
nonjusticiable. Justice Kennedy, the crucial fifth vote in Vieth, rejected the
view that such cases are necessarily nonjusticiable, but he voted to reject the
partisan gerrymandering claim on grounds that no one-not the parties,
106 Posting of Rick Pildes to SCOTUSblog,
http://www.scotusblog.com/movabletype/archives/2O06/06/todaysopinion_1 1.html
(June 26, 2006, 11:44 EST).
107 See id.
108 541 U.S. 267 (2004).
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amici, nor the Supreme Court Justices writing dissents-had yet come up
with a manageable standard for separating permissible consideration of voter
party registration information from impermissible partisan gerrymandering.
Those advocating the anti-competition paradigm were at first heartened
when the Court agreed to hear the Texas re-redistricting cases, consolidated
under the name LULAC v. Perry. 109 Partisan gerrymandering was among the
issues raised in LULAC. The battle appeared to be for the vote of Justice
Kennedy, though if Chief Justice Roberts or Justice Alito were willing to
join the four Vieth dissenters (Justices Breyer, Ginsburg, Souter, and
Stevens), there could have been a majority to police partisan gerrymandering
without Justice Kennedy's vote.
Professors Pildes, Issacharoff, and Neuborne filed an amicus brief, 10 in
LULAC urging that the Court use the Elections Clause I ' -giving the states
the power to set the "times, places and manner" of congressional elections,
subject to congressional override-to require legislatures to draw
competitive congressional districts. 112 They urged the Court to read the
Elections Clause in conjunction with other provisions of the Constitution to
"prohibit state legislative efforts to systematically design non-competitive
congressional election districts and frustrate the Constitution's essential
requirement that members of Congress be electorally accountable to the
voters." 113 They argued that at the very least mid-decade congressional
redistricting done absent judicial compulsion or extraordinary circumstances
(such as a population shifts after a Category Five hurricane) exceeded state
legislative power under the Elections Clause.114 Thus, these professors
109 126 S. Ct. 2594 (2006).
110 Brief for Samuel Issacharoff, Burt Neubome, and Richard H. Pildes as Amici
Curiae in Support of Appellants, LULAC v. Perry, 126 S. Ct. 2594 (2006) (Nos. 05-204,
05-254, 05-276, and 05-439) available at
http://www.jenner.com/files/tbls69NewsDocumentOrder/FileUpload50/539/BriefAmi
ciCuriaeIssacharoffNeubomePildes.pdf.
111 U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 4, cl. 1.
112 Brief for Samuel Issacharoff, Burt Neubome, and Richard H. Pildes, supra note
110, at 6.
113 Id. I suspect that the reason the authors suggested that the Elections Clause be
read in conjunction with other parts of the Constitution, such as the First Amendment,
was to allow a follow-up argument, if the Elections Clause argument was successful,
challenging state and local redistricting for partisan advantage. After LULAC, the Court
held that private parties sometimes lack standing to challenge redistricting decisions
under the Elections Clause. Lance v. Coffman, 127 S. Ct. 1194, 1198 (2007) (per
curiam).
114 Brief for Samuel Issacharoff, Burt Neubome, and Richard H. Pildes, supra note
110, at 21.
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offered a "textual hook". for the Justices to embrace the structural anti-
competitive approach and reject an individual rights approach to the question
of partisan gerrymandering.
For Professor Pildes and others who agree with his approach, the
LULAC decision was undoubtedly a profound disappointment."15 The
Elections Clause argument in particular and the anti-competition approach in
general failed to gain traction in LULAC. Justice Kennedy did not discuss
the approach in his opinion, which simply mirrored his statement in Vieth
that no one has created any judicially manageable standards for judging
partisan gerrymandering. Sticking with an individual rights approach to the
question, Justice Kennedy wrote that a party challenging a districting plan as
an unconstitutional partisan gerrymander must "show a burden, as measured
by a reliable standard, on the complainants' representational rights."'116 He
offered no clues on how to create such a standard, after offering clues in
Vieth for litigants to look to the First Amendment, to history, and to
technology. 117 In LULAC, Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Alito agreed
with Justice Kennedy's "determination that appellants have not provided 'a
115 See Posting of Rick Pildes to SCOTUSblog,
http://www.scotusblog.com/movabletype/archives/2006/06/first-thoughts l.html (June
28, 2006, 13:32 EST) ("Looking forward on this issue, might partisan gerrymandering
violate the Constitution in other contexts? Technically, the answer remains yes, as it has
for many years now. Practically, though, the opinion makes it less likely the Court will
find an actual violation. Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Alito once again signalled their
unwillingness to confront precedents they did not have to address; showing a cautious
moderation, both refused to take positions on the large question of whether partisan
gerrymandering is ever unconstitutional. But Justice Kennedy rejected yet another effort
to craft such a standard. Because Justice Kennedy has been more open to the possibility
of such a standard, his rejection of every actual standard offered to him, including the
one today, makes it harder for plaintiffs to win on partisan gerrymandering claims.").
Professor Issacharoff expressed similar disappointment at the LULAC decision in a
public conference call among election law specialists organized by Professor Persily.
Webcast: Panel Discussion Concerning the Supreme Court's Decision in the Texas
Redistricting Case (June 28, 2006),
http://muses.law.upenn.edu:8080/pennlaw/faculty/npersily/conferenceO62806.mp3 (listen
to Prof. Issacharoff at approximately 6 minutes into the webcast) (stating that the
Supreme Court in LULAC sends "the message that the only way that the Court will
entertain an attack on a partisan gerrymander is to frame it as a race question, and
unfortunately that message comes through loud and clear in this opinion").
116 LULAC v. Perry, 126 S. Ct. 2594, 2610 (2006).
117 For a criticism of these suggestions, see generally Richard L. Hasen, Looking for
Standards (in All the Wrong Places): Partisan Gerrymandering Claims After Vieth, 3
ELECTION L.J. 626 (2004).
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reliable standard for identifying unconstitutional political gerrymanders,""' 18
and they left open the possibility they would conclude in a future case that
all such claims are nonjusticiable. They certainly stand at least with Justice
Kennedy in rejecting all of the standards proposed to date.
The Court's rejection of the anti-competition approach extends beyond
its partisan gerrymandering jurisprudence. If anything, the Court has moved
away from that approach in recent years. For example, the Court for the first
time in 1997 recognized that state legislatures may choose election rules that
favor the "two-party system" in the name of promoting political stability," 19
a decision that entrenches the existing two party duopoly rather than opening
electoral competition up to third parties and independent candidates. 120 Even
in recent cases where members of the Court have used rhetoric suggesting a
concern over election laws stifling political competition, 121 the Court has
engaged in tepid balancing that fails to prevent legislative self-dealing. 122
Justice Breyer may be the only Justice fully on board with the anti-
competition approach.
Moreover, even within the Court's campaign finance jurisprudence, the
Court has not embraced the anti-competition approach to judging the
constitutionality of campaign finance laws. Shrink Missouri certainly was
not focused on promoting political competition, nor was McConnell v. FEC.
Indeed, both Justice Scalia and Justice Kennedy argued in their dissents that
BCRA is an "incumbent protection" scheme.' 23 The majority's response to
118 LULAC, 126 S. Ct. at 2652 (Roberts, C.J., concurring in part, concurring in the
judgment in part, and dissenting in part).
119 Timmons v. Twin Cities Area New Party, 520 U.S. 351, 369-70 (1997).
120 See Richard L. Hasen, Entrenching the Duopoly: Why the Supreme Court
Should Not Allow the States to Protect the Democrats and Republicans from Political
Competition, 1997 SuP. CT. REv. 331.
121 See, e.g., Clingman v. Beaver, 125 S. Ct. 2029, 2044 (2005) (O'Connor, J.,
concurring) ("Although the State has a legitimate-and indeed critical-role to play in
regulating elections, it must be recognized that it is not a wholly independent or neutral
arbiter. Rather, the State is itself controlled by the political party or parties in power,
which presumably have an incentive to shape the rules of the electoral game to their own
benefit."); see also id. at 2045 ("[H]eightened scrutiny helps to ensure that such
limitations are truly justified and that the State's asserted interests are not merely a
pretext for exclusionary or anticompetitive restrictions.").
122 Richard L. Hasen, Bad Legislative Intent, 2006 Wis. L. REv. 843, 884-88.
123 McConnell v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 540 U.S. 93, 248 (2003) (Scalia, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part) ("We are governed by Congress, and this
legislation prohibits the criticism of Members of Congress by those entities most capable
of giving such criticism loud voice .. "); id. at 306 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part) (arguing that in sum the soft money provisions of BCRA "look very
much like an incumbency protection plan").
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this argument was a characteristically tepid footnote apparently added late in
the drafting process: 124
Any concern that Congress might opportunistically pass campaign-finance
regulation for self-serving ends is taken into account by the applicable level
of scrutiny. Congress must show concrete evidence that a particular type of
financial transaction is corrupting or gives rise to the appearance of
corruption and that the chosen means of regulation are closely drawn to
address that real or apparent corruption. 12 5
The majority added: "At bottom, Justice Kennedy has long disagreed
with the basic holding of Buckley and its progeny that less rigorous
scrutiny-which shows a measure of deference to Congress in an area where
it enjoys particular expertise-applies to assess limits on campaign
contributions."'126 The Court made no effort to seriously consider how
BCRA affected the competitiveness of elections in a manner parallel to the
effort made in Randall with regard to Vermont's low contribution limits.
Even if one were to chalk up dismissal of the anti-competition paradigm
in pre-Randall cases to the fact that they came before a shift in Randall,
Randall itself does not support finding a paradigm shift toward anti-
competition. First, we should not lose sight of the fact that the plurality's
anti-competition test is embraced by only three Justices in a plurality
opinion, and at least one (and perhaps two of the three) of the Justices
provisionally joined pending a future frontal attack on Buckley. So there is
no majority of the Court that has embraced the anti-competition test, even in
Randall.
Second, the plurality did not even apply the anti-competition paradigm
throughout the issues in Randall. In particular, when the Randall plurality
considered the constitutionality of the candidate spending limits, its test was
not whether such spending limits in fact promote political competition-the
issue of political competition is not mentioned even once in Part II of the
plurality opinion examining the constitutionality of candidate spending
limits. The plurality instead considered only whether Buckley's holding
barring expenditure limits should be reexamined, concluding it should not. If
political competition mattered more than individual First Amendment
124 See Hasen, supra note 5, at 61 n. 144, for an explanation of why I conclude that
this footnote was added late in the drafting process.




rights, 12 7 the plurality should have considered the effects of candidate
spending limits on political competition. 12 8
It is not that the plurality did not know of the issue. Justice Stevens, in
his dissent, noted that the city of Albuquerque, New Mexico had candidate
expenditure limits in place from 1974-2001 (except for a two year period),
until the courts struck down the limits as inconsistent with Buckley. Justice
Stevens wrote:
In its findings of fact [in the case challenging the Albuquerque candidate
spending limits], the Federal District Court determined that "[n]ationwide,
eighty-eight percent (88%) of incumbent Mayors successfully sought
reelection in 1999. In contrast, since 1974, the City has had a zero percent
(0%) success rate for Mayors seeking reelection." The court further
concluded that the "system of unlimited spending has deleterious effects on
the competitiveness of elections because it gives incumbent candidates an
electoral advantage." While far from conclusive, this example cuts against
the view that there is a slam-dunk correlation between expenditure limits
and incumbent advantage. See also Brief for Center for Democracy and
Election Management at American University as Amicus Curiae (concluding
that Canada, the United Kingdom, New Zealand, and Malta-all of which
have campaign expenditure limits-have more electoral competition than
the United States, Jamaica, Ireland, and Australia-all of which lack such
limits). 129
The Randall plurality's adoption of a new anti-competition test therefore
cannot be explained by a broad shift in the Court toward accepting structural
arguments in election law cases, and it cannot be explained by a smaller,
similar shift in just its campaign finance cases. What then does explain it? It
appears that it was much a matter of happenstance, part of Justice Breyer's
127 Cf Pildes, supra note 106 ("None of the harms noted [by the Randall plurality]
involve individual First Amendment rights in any conventional sense.").
128 For example, Alan Gerber contends that if-as Gerber argues-additional
incumbent spending increases the chances of incumbent victory, "spending caps, even if
set lower than some challengers' campaign spending levels, can significantly increase the
chances of challenger victory." Alan Gerber, Estimating the Effect of Campaign
Spending on Senate Election Outcomes Using Instrumental Variables, 92 AM. POL. SCi.
REV. 401, 410 (1998). There is a vigorous academic debate, summarized at the beginning
of Gerber, over whether, as Gary Jacobson has posited, challenger spending matters
much more than incumbent spending for electoral competition. Id. at 401-02. If Jacobson
is correct, then spending limits could decrease, rather than increase, the chances of
challenger victory.
129 Randall v. Sorrell, 126 S. Ct. 2479, 2510 n.4 (2006) (Stevens, J., dissenting)
(citations omitted).
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rear-guard action to save whatever he could of the Court's earlier
jurisprudence upholding campaign finance regulation.
Justice Breyer appeared genuinely concerned at the Randall oral
argument that the limits in Vermont were too low, despite his general belief
in deference to legislative expertise. 130 Justice Breyer easily could have
written an opinion for himself alone preserving much of Shrink Missouri, but
distinguishing the Vermont limits as simply too low. That opinion would
have reaffirmed the need for judicial deference to legislative decisionmaking
in most cases and the interests "on both sides" of the constitutional equation.
But he likely faced a post-argument conference with five other Justices who
agreed the Vermont limits were unconstitutional, and some of whom were on
record as. wanting to dismantle the New Deference cases and move to
deregulation of campaign financing. A "participatory self-government"
opinion of Justice Breyer stood little chance of attracting the votes of two
new Justices with generally conservative reputations. 31 Chief Justice
Roberts' questioning of Vermont's attorney general showed a great deal of
skepticism about the corruption rationale for Vermont's limits,132 and Justice
Breyer may have worried he would join the Justice Thomas opinion. Justice
Alito, too, presented such a danger.
Justice Breyer therefore likely drafted his plurality opinion in an effort
to forestall the creation of a five-Justice majority opinion dismantling
Buckley's holding on contribution limits. Chief Justice Roberts, who had
promised during the confirmation process to move slowly and with humility
in deciding Supreme Court cases, 133 likely had no appetite for such a broad
holding unless absolutely necessary. Thus, the Chief was able to vote
130 Transcript of Oral Argument at 31, Randall v. Sorrell, 126 S. Ct. 2479 (2006)
(No. 04-1528), http://www.supremecourtus.gov/oral-arguments/argument-transcripts/04-
1528.pdf (question from Justice Breyer to Vermont Attorney General) ("That is, the
question is, what we're interested in is-at least what I've written that I'm interested in, is
at what point do these become so low that they really, as a significant matter, shut off the
possibility of a challenge. And from that point of view, your numbers, which do not tell
me the expenditures in a competitive district, and your numbers, which do not explain all
the problems that Judge Winter had with these things, do not help.").
131 See Hasen, supra note 7, at 671-72, 677-78 (predicting that Chief Justice
Roberts and Justice Alito will vote in a more conservative direction in election law
cases).
132 Transcript of Oral Argument at 26-28, Randall, 126 S. Ct. 2479 (No. 04-1528).
133 See Sheryl Gay Stolberg & Adam Liptak, Light Moments Amid Sharp
Exchanges, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 14, 2005, at Al; see also Hasen, supra note 7, at 677-78
(noting that the question regarding the two new Justices and campaign financing is
whether they "will stick with the status quo, perhaps in the name of judicial modesty and
stare decisis, or move more aggressively toward the Justice Thomas deregulation model
for campaign financing") (footnote omitted).
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sincerely for a result (strike down the Vermont limits) while, at least for
now, applying the existing precedent of Buckley in the name of stare decisis,
and leaving open additional consideration in a future case. Justice Alito
signaled that point, and there was no need for the Chief Justice to "pile on"
by signing Justice Alito's separate opinion.134
The anti-competition paradigm of the Randall plurality emerges in the
desire to both (1) strike down the Vermont limits and (2) do so in a way that
follows (or appears to follow) the Buckley precedent. Justice Breyer built the
paradigm relying solely on this single sentence in Buckley explaining
generally how contribution limits may infringe upon First Amendment
rights: "Given the important role of contributions in financing political
campaigns, contribution restrictions could have a severe impact on political
dialogue if the limitations prevented candidates and political committees
from amassing the resources necessary for effective advocacy."'1 35 Justice
Breyer was able to use this sentence to defend the result in the Vermont case
as consistent with Buckley and respect for stare decisis, thereby avoiding the
possibility that Justice Thomas's degregulationist opinion could have
become a majority opinion for the Court.
Although Justice Breyer in Randall was able to use this sentence from
Buckley to construct his anti-competition test, the sentence read in context
does not suggest the strong anti-competition reading Justice Breyer gives it.
Immediately after the "amassing the resources" sentence, the Buckley Court
added:
There is no indication, however, that the contribution limitations imposed by
the Act would have any dramatic adverse effect on the funding of campaigns
and political associations. The overall effect of the Act's contribution
ceilings is merely to require candidates and political committees to raise
funds from a greater number of persons and to compel people who would
otherwise contribute amounts greater than the statutory limits to expend
such funds on direct political expression, rather than to reduce the total
amount of money potentially available to promote political expression. 
136
134 See Foley, supra note 94 ("[W]hen examining the final draft of Breyer's opinion,
as it stood ready for public release, Chief Justice Roberts may have asked himself: 'Is
there anything in here that I absolutely need to disavow today in order to keep my options
open in the future, including the option of joining with other members of the Court to
overrule Buckley on the issue of contribution limits?' 'No' is the answer that the Chief
Justice honestly could have given himself to this question, and that fact alone provides
sufficient basis for being cautious about the implications of his joining Breyer's opinion
without submitting a separate statement of his own.").
135 Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 21 (1976).
136 Id. at 21-22 (footnote omitted).
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Footnote 23, in the middle of this quoted material, reads:
Statistical findings agreed to by the parties reveal that approximately 5.1%
of the $73,483,613 raised by the 1,161 candidates for Congress in 1974 was
obtained in amounts in excess of $1,000. In 1974, two major-party
senatorial candidates, Ramsey Clark and Senator Charles Mathias, Jr.,
operated large-scale campaigns on contributions raised under a voluntarily
imposed $100 contribution limitation. 137
Recall that Buckley, too, rejected a challenge to the amount of the FECA
limits, proclaiming "no scalpel" to separate a $1,000 limit from a $2,000
limit.138
Remember as well that the majority in Shrink Missouri applied the
"amassing the resources" language in Buckley to create a much more
deferential test for judging low contribution limits, one that Justice Souter
rightfully described in his Randall dissent as an extremely deferential
"political audibility" test. This proves not only that Buckley does not
mandate the anti-competition paradigm, but that it can be read in multiple,
contradictory ways. Thus, Randall does little to add to the coherence of
campaign finance law or election law in general. It just adds to the
incoherence.
IV. RANDALL'S INTERNAL INCOHERENCE AND THE FALSE ALLURE OF
TECHNOCRATIC ANSWERS
The last Part aimed to show that Randall's focus on competition fits
coherently into neither the Supreme Court's larger election law
jurisprudence nor its campaign finance jurisprudence. This Part turns from
external coherence to the internal coherence of the competition test for low
contribution limits, finding the test less predictable and coherent than its
technocratic nature suggests.
Though the Randall plurality's anti-competition test for judging the
constitutionality of low campaign contribution limits is considerably less
deferential than earlier tests suggested by Justice Breyer,139 it still has the
technocratic feel of a Justice Breyer opinion, setting out a multi-part test
relying upon empirical evidence from experts to assist the courts in the
exercise of independent judicial judgment.
137 Id. at21 n.23.
138 Id. at 30.
139 See supra notes 45-49 and accompanying text.
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The plurality imposes a two-part test, first requiring a court judging the
constitutionality of a low campaign contribution limit to look for "danger
signs" that the risks to political competition from the low limit are too great
and then to address the tailoring of the law through an "assess[ment of] the
proportionality of the restrictions." 140
The plurality's test has a superficial aura of scientific exactness to it.14 1
It makes the empirical assumption that "contribution limits that are too low
can... harm the electoral process by preventing challengers from mounting
effective campaigns against incumbent officeholders, thereby reducing
democratic accountability."'142 It then envisions expert testimony from social
scientists on the question whether the particular limits that a legislative body
has put in place will in fact harm political competition.
The plurality's opinion furthers the aura of technocratic decisionmaking
by giving these experts pointers for good scientific methods in testing the
effect of the limits on competition. For example, the plurality praises the
petitioners' expert witness in Randall for looking at how contribution limits
would have affected the most competitive races and criticizes the respondent
expert's examination of how contribution limits affected the average
races. 143 The plurality explained:
[T]he critical question concerns not simply the average effect of
contribution limits on fundraising but, more importantly, the ability of a
candidate running against an incumbent officeholder to mount an effective
challenge. And information about average races, rather than competitive
races, is only distantly related to that question, because competitive races
are likely to be far more expensive than the average race. 144
But both the plurality's initial assumption-that low contribution limits
harm challengers-and its faith in expert testimony are flawed. As to the
initial assumption, the evidence has not been established that low
contribution limits harm challengers. As Professor Persily recently noted,
140 Randall v. Sorrell, 126 S. Ct. 2479, 2492 (2006) (plurality opinion).
141 But it is not even clear that its two-part test really has two parts. See Briffault,
supra note 8, at 831.
142 Randall, 126 S. Ct. at 2492 (plurality opinion). Justice Breyer made this same
assumption in his earlier Shrink Missouri concurrence: "But we should not defer in
respect to whether its solution, by imposing too low a contribution limit, significantly
increases the reputation-related or media-related advantages of incumbency and thereby
insulates legislators from effective electoral challenge." Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov't PAC,
528 U.S. 377, 404 (2000) (Breyer, J., concurring).
143 Randall, 126 S. Ct. at 2495-96 (plurality opinion).
144 Id. at 2496 (plurality opinion) (original emphasis).
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Despite the emphatic pronouncements of the justices in these cases,
those who study the relationship between campaign finance reforms and
levels of electoral competition have not arrived at any firm conclusions as to
the reforms' effects. Although the Court has assumed what seems to be an
intuitive pro-incumbent bias of campaign contribution limits, the actual
support for that relationship is mixed, at best, with most studies finding no
effect and some concluding that limits enhance competition. 14 5
Professors Primo, Milyo, and Groseclose-at least two of whom have
written skeptically of campaign finance regulation in the past146-agree with
Professor Persily that "we know surprisingly little about the impact of
campaign finance laws on electoral outcomes." 147 Yet their recent study of
competitiveness in gubernatorial elections concludes that "contribution
limits on individuals benefit electoral competition."' 148 "[I]ndividual
contribution limits have a large, statistically significant, and negative effect
on the size of the winning vote margin, implying an increase in
competitiveness."' 49 Indeed, focusing on the most competitive races pace the
Randall plurality, Primo, Milyo, and Groseclose's results "suggest that
campaign finance laws do not affect close races more than lop-sided races,
and in fact the reverse may be true." 150
This finding is in line with two other recent studies that have found that
contribution limits can help challengers, thereby promoting political
competition.151 In addition, Professor Jacobson recently noted that BCRA's
145 Nathaniel Persily, The Place of Competition in American Election Law, in THE
MARKETPLACE OF DEMOCRACY: ELECTORAL COMPETITION AND AMERICAN POLITICS 171,
187-88 (Michael P. McDonald & John Samples eds., 2006); see also, Nolan L. Reichl,
What We Know and What We Don't: A Review of the Literature Empirically Analyzing
the Effects of State Campaign Finance Reform Laws, 8-21 (Apr. 21, 2006) (unpublished
J.D. senior thesis, Stanford Law School), available at http://ssm.com/abstract-924434.
146 See, e.g., David M. Primo & Jeffrey Milyo, Campaign Finance Laws and
Political Efficacy: Evidence from the States, 5 ELECTION L.J. 23 (2006).
147 David M. Primo, Jeffrey Milyo & Tim Groseclose, State Campaign Finance
Reform, Competitiveness, and Party Advantage in Gubernatorial Elections, in THE
MARKETPLACE OF DEMOCRACY, supra note 145, at 268-69.
14 8 Id. at 280.
149 Id at 278.
150 1d; see also id. at 280 ("[C]ontribution limits on individuals benefit electoral
competition, and.., this effect is not driven by an impact on close races.").
151 Kihong Eom & Donald A. Gross, Contribution Limits and Disparity in
Contributions Between Gubernatorial Candidates, 59 POL. RES. Q. 99 (2006); Thomas
Stratmann & Francisco J. Aparicio-Castillo, Competition Policy for Elections: Do
Campaign Contribution Limits Matter?, 127 PUB. CHOICE 177 (2006). For an earlier
study finding no direct effects of campaign contribution limits-but finding that
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doubling of the federal individual campaign contribution limits (from $1,000
to $2,000) did not increase the competition of House races in the 2004
elections. 152
The causal mechanism of how contribution limits could help challengers
is unclear. Professors Primo, Milyo, and Groseclose posit that contribution
"[l]imits on individuals may... decrease winning margins, since incumbents
are more likely to be successful at fundraising in general (since, after all,
incumbents have already succeeded in the previous election)."' 153 The theory
appears to be that contribution limits lower the differential between the
(higher) amount that incumbents can raise and the amount that challengers
can raise, and that this relative parity in fundraising assists political
competition.
It is too early to conclude from these studies that contribution limits
necessarily promote political competition. Two of these studies involved
gubernatorial races, and the issues might be different for legislative races.
Contrary studies may appear in the future as well. And Professors Primo,
Milyo, and Groseclose note that "very low limits like those in Vermont...
merit caution." 154 Thus, there may be different effects of contribution limits
spending limits harm political competition-see Donald A. Gross, Robert K. Goidel, &
Todd G. Shields, State Campaign Finance Regulations and Electoral Competition, 30
AM. POL. RES. 143 (2002). Limits on political party contributions may have a greater
negative effect on the competitiveness of races. See Thad Kousser & Ray LaRaja, The
Effect of Campaign Finance Laws on Electoral Competition: Evidence from the States,
426 POL'Y ANALYSIS 1 (2002). This is a question that merits much further study.
152 Gary C. Jacobson, The First Congressional Elections After BCRA, in THE
ELECTION AFTER REFORM: MONEY, POLITICS, AND THE BIPARTISAN CAMPAIGN REFORM
ACT 185, 185 (Michael J. Malbin ed., 2006).
153 Primo, Milyo, & Groseclose, supra note 147, at 273. The authors further
expected contribution limits to advantage "Democrats, who in general do not have as
deep a donor pool as Republicans." Id. But the authors' empirical study determined that
such limits do not benefit either political party. Id. at 280. The authors also posited that
limits on contributions by organizations (such as corporations) could improve
competitiveness, "since organizations are more likely to contribute to an incumbent than
a challenger." Id. at 273. But the authors concluded from their empirical study that
"merely having organizational contribution limits in place has no impact on
competitiveness." Id. at 277. Professors Eom and Gross offer some additional reasons to
believe that contribution limits can help challengers: (1) some contributors wishing to
influence a narrow area of policy might be more inclined to contribute to both candidates
in the presence of contribution limits to assure access to the winner; (2) contribution
limits might "reduce incumbent spending while not affecting the level of challenger
spending"; or (3) contribution limits might reduce incumbent spending more than they
reduce challenger spending. Eom & Gross, supra note 151, at 106. This is certainly an
area for additional research.
154 Primo, Milyo, & Groseclose, supra note 147, at 280-8 1.
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in different amounts-and the difference will matter state by state. A $400
limit in Vermont is not the same as a $400 limit in New York.155 But the
point to be gleaned from the social science literature is that the Randall
plurality is wrong if it assumes that "contribution limits hurt challengers" is
the accepted conventional wisdom among political scientists. If anything, the
issue is subject to intense debate.
It is not that surprising that the conventional wisdom may be wrong, or is
at least difficult to test. There is an "endogeneity" problem with figuring out
how campaign finance rules affect the competitiveness of races: "spending
both influences and is influenced by the competitiveness of a race."'1 56
Professor Gerber notes some reasons why spending levels are influenced by
electoral conditions: "(1) As the probability of victory rises, it is easier for a
candidate to raise money; (2) if the election looks close, supporters are more
likely to contribute to the candidates; and (3) if the incumbent becomes sure
of victory, the incumbent scales back fundraising activity."' 157
This endogeneity problem in figuring out how contribution limits affect
electoral competition is compounded by the phenomenon of adaptation,
which makes any expert testimony on how particular contribution limits are
likely to affect political competition in a particular jurisdiction sketchy at
best. The adaptation phenomenon is a corollary of the "hydraulic effect" of
campaign financing: "Money, like water, will always find an outlet."'158
Under the adaptation phenomenon, if a jurisdiction imposes new, lower
contribution limits, donations will continue to flock to competitive races as
155 Id. at 276 ("Put concretely, does a $1,000 limit on individual contributions to a
candidate mean the same thing in Arkansas as it does in California?").
156Id, at 272. The authors represent the endogeneity problem in this graphic,
reprinted with permission:
Figure 12-1. The ComplexWeb of Cempaign Finance Laws
and Election Outcome&
157 Gerber, supra note 128, at 402.
158 McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 224 (2003); see also Samuel Issacharoff &




the parties and candidates target additional donors to make smaller donations
allowed under the new limits.
A major problem with analyses such as the one offered by plaintiffs'
expert in Randall is that it assumes a static pool of donors and ignores the
adaptation phenomenon. Thus, the Randall plurality supports its argument 159
by noting the petitioners' expert testimony that "concluded that Act 64's
contribution limits would have reduced the funds available in 1998 to
Republican challengers in competitive races in amounts ranging from 18% to
53% of their total campaign income." 160 This assumes that the same pool of
donors-and no one else-would have donated to the candidate up to the
amount of the limits. It is more plausible to believe that additional donors
would have been found to make sure those races stay competitive if run
under the new limits.
I have confidence for two reasons that lower contribution limits would
not necessarily inhibit the ability of candidates to run a competitive
campaign. First, smaller donors are already the backbone of competitive
federal campaigns. The bulk of donors on the federal level give in amounts
far lower than the federal limits. As Professors Ansolabehere, de Figueiredo,
and Snyder found, "[w]hen increased demand for campaign funds induces
candidates to raise additional funds, they turn not to political action
committees or even large individual donors, but to small individual donors,
who give an average of about $100." 161
Second, the experience with BCRA shows that the small donor
phenomenon has been bolstered by the rise of Internet-based fundraising. In
the last few elections, the Internet has become a powerful tool to get out the
message to small donors that they should make small donations to
competitive races. 162 During the 2004 presidential election in the period
before public financing kicked in, George Bush raised $78 million in
campaign contributions from those giving less than $200 each (up from $10
159 The plurality hedges, noting that "the record suggests, though it does not
conclusively prove, that Act 64's contribution limits will significantly restrict the amount
of funding available for challengers to run competitive campaigns." Randall v. Sorrell,
126 S. Ct. 2479, 2495 (2006).
160 Id.
161 Stephen Ansolabehere, John M. de Figueiredo & James M. Snyder Jr., Why is
There So Little Money in US. Politics?, 17 J. ECON. PERSP. 105, 124-25 (2003).
162 Kelly D. Patterson, Spending in the 2004 Election, in FINANCING THE 2004
ELECTION 68, 80 (David B. Magleby, Anthony Corrado & Kelly D. Patterson eds., 2006)
("A major development in 2004 was the use of the Internet in fundraising by candidates,
parties, and interest groups.").
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million in that category in 2000)163 and John Kerry raised "$79 million in
donations of less than $200. ' ' 164 These are astounding numbers, though part
of the overall increase is due to the raising of the individual contribution
limit to federal candidates from $1,000 to $2,000 per election.
The adaptation phenomenon is by now well established. Before BCRA,
many were predicting that BCRA would decimate the political parties, which
depended on six- and seven-figure "soft money" donations from labor
unions, corporations, and wealthy individuals. 165 After BCRA, unions and
corporations could no longer make donations to the parties from their
corporate treasuries, and individual contributions to parties were greatly
limited to "hard money" amounts (at higher rates than under prior law); yet
the two national parties raised more in money from individuals under the
"hard money" limits in 2004 than they raised in hard and soft money
combined in the 2000 election. 166 In addition, in 2004 the Democratic
National Committee raised $166 million from contributors giving less than
$200 each (up from $60 million in 2000) and the Republican National
Committee raised $157 million from these donors (up from $91 million in
2000). In short, competition, especially today, can thrive even under lower
contribution limits.
Expert testimony on how contribution limits would affect competition
must do even more than predict the kind of adaptation that would take place
under the new rules; it must also consider how the new limits would affect
competition in the broader context of other campaign finance and election
law rules. For example, Vermont's Act 64 includes generous voluntary
public financing, which gave participating incumbents only 85% or 90%
(depending on the office) of the amount available to participating
challengers. 167 The availability of that public financing-with an edge given
to challengers-might make races more competitive. 168 In addition, experts
would have to consider other factors such as term limits and redistricting (in
163 John C. Green, Financing the 2004 Presidential Nomination Campaigns, in
FINANCING THE 2004 ELECTION, supra note 162, at 93, 104.
164 Id. at 105.
165 Robin Kolodny & Diana Dwyre, A New Rule Book: Party Money after BCRA, in
FINANCING THE 2004 ELECTION, supra note 162, at 183.
166 Id. at 183-84.
167 See VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 17, § 2805a(c) (2005).
168 The literature on this question is muddled as well. See Reichl, supra note 145, at
24-38. Professors Primo, Milyo, and Groseclose found no statistically significant effect
of public financing on the competitiveness of gubernatorial races. Primo, Milyo, &
Groseclose, supra note 147, at 278.
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legislative races), in making a judgment as to how low contribution limits
would affect the outcome of contested races. 169
In the end, cases challenging the constitutionality of low contribution
limits will devolve into a "battle of the experts" over how such limits would
affect political competition. But such testimony often will be speculative
when it comes to whether enough money may be raised (by the candidates or
others) to ensure a competitive race. Court decisions could well turn upon a
thin credibility determination to be made by the court, a determination that
may depend not so much upon an evaluation of social science but upon each
judge's predisposition to favor or oppose the particular campaign finance
regulation. 170
There is some evidence that the Randall plurality itself fell victim to this
predisposition. Though the plurality chastised Vermont's expert for relying
on average races in looking at effects on political competition, that's not all
he did. For example, the expert, Professor Gierzynski, provided the
following relevant information:
The case of Deb Markowitz [candidate for Vermont secretary of state]
clearly demonstrated that it is possible to run an effective campaign raising
money in mostly small amounts. Only 3.1% of her contributions exceeded
the new $400 limit. $7,500 of her revenue, or 14.3% of her total revenue,
was from amounts over the limit (it would take a mere 19 contributions at
the $400 limit to replace the amount). And without any previous electoral
experience she unseated an incumbent candidate in a close race. 171
The Randall plurality also rejected contrary evidence from the
Burlington, Vermont mayoral race, finding "the facts of that particular
election are not described in sufficient detail to offer a convincing refutation
of the implication arising from the petitioners' experts' studies."'172 The
district court gave the following description of that race:
169 Cf Jacobson, supra note 152, at 202 ("Whether BCRA can actually make
elections more competitive, at least at the House level, is more doubtful because
competition depends so heavily on the partisan makeup of constituencies and the
strategic decisions of candidates and contributors, variables totally beyond BCRA's
influence.").
170 See Briffault, supra note 8, at 831 ("A competitiveness standard... increases
the judicial role, requires a close engagement with the record, and is open to conflicting
readings of the same evidence.").
171 Expert Report of Anthony Gierzynski, Joint Appendix 50, Randall v. Sorrell,
126 S. Ct. 2479 (2006) (Nos. 04-1528, 04-1530, and 04-1697).
172 Randall v. Sorrell, 126 S. Ct. 2479, 2496 (2006) (plurality opinion).
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Example: The March 1999 Burlington Mayoral election. Contribution limits
of $200 were in effect for the March 1999 Burlington Mayoral race. The
two principal candidates for mayor in 1999 were Peter Clavelle and Kurt
Wright. Both were able to amass sufficient resources to run effective
campaigns. Clavelle raised almost $39,000, more than he raised in three of
his four previous campaigns for mayor. He raised more than $24,000 from
794 contributors of $100 or less. Only 55 contributors gave him the
maximum contribution of $200. Wright raised $19,000. Although he
received 44 contributions of $200, this was only 13% of all his contributors.
He received 290 contributions, amounting to over half of his funds, from
contributors of $100 or less. By his own statements, Wright ran an effective
campaign in a competitive race against incumbent Clavelle. 17 3
I am not suggesting that these two anecdotes prove that Vermont's new
lower contribution limits would have promoted political competition. But
there is going to be enough flexibility in the Randall plurality's test that
judges hearing from competing experts will (albeit subconsciously) hear
what they want to hear about how particular campaign contribution limits are
likely to affect the competitiveness of close elections. The Randall
plurality's test fails to achieve internal consistency and coherence.
V. ACHIEVING COHERENCE THROUGH TRANSPARENCY AND CAREFUL
BALANCING
Parts III and IV set forth the view that the new campaign finance
jurisprudence of Randall is as incoherent as its predecessor jurisprudence.
What should be put in its place? For those who have read my earlier work,
the answer will be unsurprising: the Court should judge the constitutionality
of low campaign contribution limits and other campaign finance laws
through careful balancing. In particular, courts should engage in a careful
and honest balancing that gives considerable deference to the value
judgments made by states in enacting campaign finance laws, but then use
close scrutiny to make sure the measure is carefully drawn to meet those
goals. If the measure is not closely drawn, the court should strike it down as
unconstitutional. If it is closely drawn, the court must then consider whether
the measure is nonetheless unconstitutional because of the speech and
association costs it imposes. 174
This kind of honest balancing was impossible in Randall because of the
Court's existing campaign finance jurisprudence. Vermont was forced to
173 Landell v. Sorrell, 118 F. Supp. 2d 459, 471 (D. Vt. 2000).
174 This is the approach I developed in HASEN, supra note 11, and applied to the
Supreme Court's decision in the McConnell case in Hasen, supra note 5.
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defend its law on grounds that it was necessary to prevent corruption or the
appearance of corruption, but it had no real evidence to offer in order to
prove that such low contribution limits really were necessary to prevent
corruption or its appearance. Chief Justice Roberts' questioning at oral
argument made that point painfully clear.1 75 Certainly some contribution
limits are justified to prevent corruption (perhaps even limits as low as the
ones at issue in Shrink Missouri), but it would be very difficult to make the
anti-competition case for the strict Vermont limits.
It seems quite obvious that the real goal of the Vermont measure, hidden
from debate in order to comply with Buckley's rejection of the equality
rationale, was the promotion of political equality. The Justices ignored the
political equality argument, despite an impassioned and eloquent opinion
from Judge Calabresi to bring this issue into the open (in the way that Justice
Breyer tried to do in his Shrink Missouri concurrence):
The notion that intensity of desire is not well-measured by money in a
society where money is not equally distributed has been, since Buckley, the
huge elephant-and donkey-in the living room in all discussions of
campaign finance reform. Buckley, by fiat, declared the state's explicit
recognition and amelioration of wealth distribution problems in the electoral
marketplace to be an insufficiently compelling interest to pass constitutional
muster. And yet, I submit, it remains at least implicitly behind much
campaign finance reform legislation. 176
Thus, the real question the Randall Court should have asked is whether
the Vermont law was closely drawn to promote political equality (an interest
that the Vermont legislature was permitted to, but need not necessarily,
adopt) and, if so, whether the costs to individuals and groups who wanted to
mobilize for political action were too great to allow the law to go forward
despite its gains in promoting political equality. 177
175 See Transcript of Oral Argument at 26-28, Randall v. Sorrell, 126 S. Ct. 2479
(No. 04-1528).
176 Landell v. Sorrell, 406 F.3d 159, 162 (2d. Cir. 2005) (citations omitted)
(Calabresi, J., concurring in the denial of rehearing en banc).
177 This test is not only different from the Randall plurality's test, it is also a much
more skeptical test than Justice Souter's New Deference test which asks if a campaign
contribution is so low as to be "laughable" or if the limits would depress candidates'




Social science evidence on the law's effects could have helped in
answering both questions. 17 8 First, on the question whether the law would
promote political equality, social scientists could consider what channels of
election-related communication the law would be expected to equalize. On
the one hand, a law that makes it much more difficult (than under former
law) for some groups or individuals to express candidate support through the
jurisdiction's usual means of political communication would be hard to
justify on political equality grounds. On the other hand, a law that subsidizes
election-related communications (through public financing, for example) or
that provides structured election-related debates could more easily be seen as
promoting political equality.
If it is plausible to believe from the social science evidence that the
challenged law promotes some version of political equality, the court should
next consider the costs of such laws to individuals or groups. A law, for
example, that forbids all election-related advertising might be said in some
perverse way to promote a kind of political equality (though not of the
"participatory self-government" variety promoted by Justice Breyer), but the
costs of such a system to the rights of individuals and groups to organize for
political action would be simply too high to justify such a law. In general,
the task of social scientists in this second stage is to examine the change in
campaign finance laws as a whole and, considering the hydraulic effect of
campaign money and the adaptation phenomenon, ask whether significant
election-related activity is likely to be curtailed by the new law. Social
scientists can point out the likely costs of such a system and then judges can
make an independent judgment in balancing the state's interests against
potential costs.
Significantly, the kinds of political science questions that courts would
need to examine under my proposed test are more likely to lead to
determinate results than the anti-competition test of the Randall plurality.
That is, my proposed test has political scientists asking easier-to-answer
questions: Will the law open or close doors of election-related
communication? Considering the expense of election-related
communications in the jurisdiction, is vibrant political debate likely to occur
under the new system? How does the new system compare to the old system
in terms of the expected vibrancy of political debate? Unlike the Randall
test, my proposed test does not require courts to determine whether
challengers would be able to raise enough money to potentially win closely
178 See Hasen, supra note 122, at 880 (arguing for a focus on the effect of election
law legislation on the rights of individuals and groups rather than a focus on the intent of
the legislative body in passing the legislation).
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contested races, a question that is probably unanswerable in most
circumstances.
Without evidence from a trial conducted on the proper questions, I
cannot answer definitively how I would have liked the Court to decide a
constitutional challenge to Vermont's contribution limits under my proposed
standards. But there are reasons to be concerned about the constitutionality
of Vermont's law under the second part of my test. The Vermont law, as the
plurality noted, made it very difficult for volunteers even to provide enough
coffee and donuts to organize for political action, 179 or for political parties to
collect and pool very small donations from groups of individuals to support
candidates backed by the party. 180 From these facts, I have serious concerns
the Vermont law would have prevented a "vibrancy and diversity of election-
related speech,"'181 even assuming it would have promoted some version of
political equality in Vermont, especially if lower limits would have
increased the pool of small donors and therefore "democratized" the donor
pool to some extent.182
Even if we had all the evidence necessary to make a judgment under my
proposed test, I doubt that the Justices on the Court would reach consensus
under my proposed test on how the balance should be struck. One can
imagine that if Justices Thomas and Souter both agreed to apply the test,
they would strike the balance differently. If that's the case, there is a danger
that my approach produces no more of a coherent or predictable means of
judging the constitutionality of campaign finance laws than the current and
earlier approaches that I have criticized.
But coherence emerges through transparency. Courts appear to already
be engaged in a sub silentio balancing of rights and interests, in a convoluted
and hidden way, because of the legacy of Buckley. By having judges engage
in balancing openly and forthrightly, we will be better able to examine and
179 Randall, 126 S. Ct. at 2498 (plurality opinion).
180 Id. at 2497 ("[I]magine that 6,000 Vermont citizens want to give $1 to the State
Democratic Party because, though unfamiliar with the details of the individual races, they
would like to make a small financial contribution to the goal of electing a Democratic
state legislature .... [The Act] permits the party to give no more than $200 to each
candidate, thereby thwarting the aims of the 6,000 donors from making a meaningful
contribution to state politics by giving a small amount of money to the party they
support.").
181 Hasen, supra note 5, at 71.
182 Cf Michael S. Kang, The Hydraulics of Party Regulation, 91 IOWA L. REv. 131,
160-72 (2005) (discussing how court-driven changes in party rules can shift balance of
power within party coalition).
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judge the value choices made by judges. 183 The giving of real reasons will
impose some rationality on the system. We will then know how the court is
weighing the competing values "on both sides" of the constitutional
equation. That, in turn, should generate core principles that may be applied
across other campaign finance, and election law, cases. The giving of clear
reasons also may crystallize the issues for potential constitutional
amendment in the face of Court rejection of reasonable campaign finance
restrictions.
VI. CONCLUSION
The Randall plurality instructs judges to use "independent judicial
judgment"'184 in judging the constitutionality of campaign contribution laws.
That instruction is correct. But the plurality strays off course in its anti-
competition focus and faith in social science evidence on the question of
how low limits affect political competition. Social science, and what it tells
us about the effects of campaign finance law on competition, can help in an
honest balancing process, but social science is no substitute for independent
judicial judgment.
Randall may turn out to be a blip before a dramatic shift on the Court
toward deregulation or, less likely, back toward the New Deference. But
despite the swings in the past and the potential for future swings, the one
consistent feature of the Court's campaign finance jurisprudence has been
incoherence. Unfortunately, Randall does nothing to improve the Court's
jurisprudence on that score. It is time for a change. Again.
183 Cf Daniel R. Ortiz, The Empirics of Campaign Finance, 78 S. CAL. L. REv. 939,
945 (2005) (suggesting that Court doctrine may be secretly coherent even if "the Court
feels unable, for whatever reason, to revise constitutional doctrine to better conform it to
what constitutional principle requires").
184 Randall, 126 S. Ct. at 2492.
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